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A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM OF THE
PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS
WELSR S. WITE t
Prosecutorial efforts to induce guilty pleas play a central role in
the administration of criminal justice. In most jurisdictions pros-
ecutors grant special concessions-usually dismissals of certain charges
or reduced sentence recommendations '-to defendants who enter guilty
pleas and thus waive their constitutional right to a trial before a judge
or jury.' This "plea bargaining" practice disposes of a remarkably
high percentage of cases.3
Despite commentators' arguments in favor of abolishing plea
bargaining,4 the Supreme Court recently acknowledged its validity in
Brady v. United States.' The defendant in Brady was charged with
kidnapping and faced a possible maximum penalty of death upon con-
viction by a jury.' By pleading guilty he reduced the maximum
possible sentence to life imprisonment.7 In a subsequent action he
sought to invalidate his plea on the grounds that it was induced both
by his fear of the death penalty and by the prosecutor's representations
concerning reduction of sentence and clemency. With regard to the
latter claim, the Court noted:
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; Visiting Assistant Pro-
fessor, University of Virginia (1970-71). B.A. 1962, Harvard University; LL.B.
1965, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania Bar. The author expresses
his appreciation to Barbara Brandon, University of Pittsburgh Law School, for her
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' See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERM iNATIO OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 78-90 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEwMAN]; Note,
Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 865, 866, 898 (1964).
2See NEwmAN 78-80.
3 One commentator has estimated that roughly 90% of all convictions result from
guilty pleas. NEWMAN 3. Limited statistical information makes a precise calculation
difficult. See PRESiDENT's COIm'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMn-STRAIxON OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPORT].
4 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
50 (1968); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REV.
1387 (1970).
5 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
6The federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. §1201(a) (1964), provides as
follows:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce, any person
who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped,
abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise,
except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by
death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the
verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
71d. See generally United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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We decline to hold . . . that a guilty plea is compelled and
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by
the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability
of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of possi-
bilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher
penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
• [W] e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for
the State to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn
extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demon-
strates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his
crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind
which affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a
shorter period of time than might otherwise be necessary.8
The Court also recognized that plea bargaining is essential to
effective utilization of "scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources." '
Prosecutors in large cities are confronted with an increasing backlog
of cases. The available judges, trial assistants, and courtrooms are
barely adequate to handle the workload generated by a system in which
only a small minority of cases are actually litigated.'" Although some
defendants may plead guilty solely for reasons of conscience, a large
number undoubtedly enter their pleas primarily in expectation of pros-
ecutorial concessions." Removal of the incentive to plead guilty would
place an intolerable strain on the system.'
The advisability of attempting to provide sufficient resources to
eliminate the need for guilty pleas is doubtful. As Professor Enker
has pointed out:
Even if the money were readily available, it would still not be
clear that we could call upon sufficient numbers of competent
personnel. A lowering of standards in order to man the store
adequately may well result in poorer justice. It may also
divert both funds and personnel from other segments of the
8397 U.S. at 751, 753.
9 Id. at 752.
1
0 See H. Lummus, THE TRiL JUDGE 43-46 (1937); TASK FORCE REPORT 80;
Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAc. LAw. 35, 37 (1962); Note,
supra note 1, at 881.
11 See Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385,
395-97 (1951); Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain
.Tustice, 46 . GRIM~. L.C. & P.S. 780, 783-85 (1956); Comment, The Influence of
the Defendat's Plea on udicIal Deternination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 210
(1956).
12 In response to a questionnaire distributed by the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review in November 1963, 53 of 62 prosecutors stated that the percentage of
guilty pleas would decrease if plea bargaining were eliminated. Note, supra note 1,
at 899. But see Scott v. United States, 419 F2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum)
("The arguments that the criminal process would collapse unless substantial induce-
ments are offered to elicit guilty pleas have tended to rely upon assumption rather
than empirical evidence.").
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criminal process, such as corrections work, where they are
arguably more needed."3
Reducing the number of guilty pleas would also additionally burden
both witnesses and jurors. 4
Accepting the premise that prosecutorial encouragement of guilty
pleas is a necessary feature of our present system of justice, it is
important to formulate guidelines which retain the advantages yet
minimize the undesirable consequences of plea bargaining. This
Article will describe some of the practices presently utilized to induce
guilty pleas, point out the salient problems with these practices, and
offer suggestions for improvement.
I. PLEA BARGAINING IN PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK
Several studies have described the general characteristics of plea
bargaining, identifying the differing approaches of prosecutors and the
types of bargains made.' To provide a slightly new perspective, I will
discuss various aspects of plea bargaining as it is conducted in the
Philadelphia and New York district attorneys' offices. Because these
offices are reputedly among the finest in the country, their plea bargain-
ing practices should reflect a high level of prosecutorial efficiency and
responsibility. The discussion of the Philadelphia prosecutor's office
is based on personal observations made while serving as an assistant
prosecutor in that office from 1966 to 1968, and on interviews con-
ducted in March and April 1970 with members of the office and with
Philadelphia defense attorneys. The discussion of New York plea
bargaining practices is based entirely on interviews conducted in April
and May 1970 with William F. Keenan, Chief of the New York
Homicide Division, and with several New York defense attorneys.
A. Philadelphia
In Philadelphia, guilty pleas dispose of approximately thirty-five
percent of all felony and misdemeanor cases. This figure is somewhat
misleading because many cases recorded as "waivers" (trials before a
judge without a jury) can be more accurately characterized as "slow
13 Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE REPORT 108, 112
[hereinafter cited as Enker]. See also ABA PRoJEcT oN MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRimiNAL JusTicE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuILTY 2 (Tent. draft 1967)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
U4 See Enker 112. The existing system already places too great a strain on
witnesses and jurors. See TASK FORCE REPORT 90-91 (noting inadequate or non-
existent facilities for witnesses and jurors; repeated trips to court, unnecessary but
for lack of notice of trial postponements; and minimal pay for jurors).
15 E.g., NEWMAx 78-104; Alschuler, supra note 4, at 52-85; Note, supra note 1,
at 866-70, 896-908.
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pleas of guilty." That is, the defendant's counsel facilitates the
presentation of evidence and implicitly or explicitly admits that the
defendant is guilty of some offense, but does not enter a formal plea.
Were all of these cases classified as guilty pleas, the figure would
probably rise to above fifty percent.
1. Office Policy
Like most prosecutors, the Philadelphia district attorney has not
established any formal rules or procedures governing plea bargaining.Y
He and his top assistants have developed general policies, however,
which are communicated to other assistant prosecutors in office meet-
ings and intra-office memos, and through a general process of osmosis.
For example, absent exceptional circumstances,' 7 office policy forbids
sentence concessions to induce pleas in certain "very serious" cases
where society's interest in obtaining an appropriate sentence is deemed
paramount. No systematic attempt is made to designate which cases
belong in this category but, according to District Attorney Arlen
Specter, the cases most likely to be considered "very serious" are those
in which the crime indicates that the defendant presents a serious and
continuing threat of violence.' Thus, sentence concessions are for-
bidden in cases involving the brutal rape of a stranger or an armed
robbery in which the victim is injured. On the other hand, plea
bargaining is condoned in dealing with crimes of passion. The theory
is that such crimes are unlikely to be repeated and thus society's interest
may be adequately served by the imposition of a substantially shorter
sentence than the defendant would probably receive following a trial
and conviction.'
Philadelphia office policy also opposes granting concessions merely
because a case might result in an acquittal. According to First
Assistant District Attorney Richard Sprague, the primary purpose of
plea bargaining is to save time and clear the dockets. If the trial
prosecutor has a weak case which may be tried without delay, no major
concessions should be offered."0
Within this basic framework, each trial prosecutor has broad
discretion regarding the concessions to be made to induce a plea. The
16 In response to the 1963 questionnaire, note 12 supra, 47 of 67 prosecutors
stated that their office had established no formal procedures. Note, supra note 1,
at 900.
17 Exceptional circumstances would include, for example, a case in which the
prosecution has insufficient evidence to go to trial. For a discussion of this situation,
see text accompanying note 25 infra.
Is Interview with Arlen Specter, District Attorney of Philadelphia, in Philadel-
phia, Mar. 25, 1970.
'9 Cf. Specter, Book Review, 76 YALE L.J. 604, 606-07 (1967).
20 Interview with Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, in
Philadelphia, Mar. 25, 1970.
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trial prosecutor is in the best position to assess the nature of his case
and to form an opinion on the defendant's probable future danger to
the community, and thus his determination of an appropriate plea
bargain is usually final. He is expected to consult with a superior
before agreeing to a plea only in the more serious cases, 2 and then his
opinion is given great weight. The manner in which the trial pros-
ecutor disposes of his cases generally receives rather cursory review.
22
When a guilty plea is entered, his sentence recommendation may be
scrutinized, but seldom is the evidence available to him at the time of
the plea independently examined. When no guilty plea is entered, top
assistants do not evaluate the trial prosecutor's efforts to induce a plea.
2. Actual Practice
Because Pennsylvania judges generally have a great deal of
flexibility in sentencing,' prosecutorial concessions usually involve
sentence recommendations rather than dismissal or reduction of
charges.24  To induce a guilty plea, the assistant prosecutor may
promise to make a specific sentence recommendation or, in some cases,
to make no sentence recommendation or not to oppose probation. The
judge is generally not a party to this arrangement. In rare cases,
however, the defendant will refuse to enter a plea unless he receives
assurance that the judge will not impose a sentence exceeding the
assistant prosecutor's recommendation. While the assistant pros-
ecutor's sentence recommendation is not binding, Philadelphia judges
generally adhere to it. The concessions offered by Philadelphia pros-
ecutors, therefore, have the effect of limiting the maximum sentence
which the defendant will receive.
The assistant prosecutor's bargaining power and the tactics he
employs to induce a guilty plea depend largely on whether the case
has been designated "major" or "non-major" and, if "non-major," on
whether the defendant is out on bail or in jail.
Nearly all cases, except those involving major felonies or excessive
violence, are designated "non-major" and listed for trial in a "bail
room" if the defendant is free on bail or in a "jail room" if he has been
21This would include all of the "very serious" cases previously discussed, text
accompanying notes 17-19 supra, as well as a fairly large number of other "major"
cases. For the definition of a "major" case, see text preceding note 28 infra.
22 Review generally occurs in an office meeting at which assistant prosecutors
are asked to give brief descriptions of case dispositions.
23 For most crimes, Pennsylvania judges have discretion to impose any sentence
from probation up to the maximum sentence prescribed by the legislature. See gen-
erally Commonwealth ex rel. Lockhart v. Myers, 193 Pa. Super. 531, 540, 165 A.2d
400, 405 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 860 (1961).
24 Dismissal or reduction of charges is a common plea bargaining practice in
other jurisdictions. See NEwmAx 78-104; Enker 108-10.
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unable to make bail. On any given day, an assistant prosecutor will
have approximately ten cases listed for trial in his court room. This
volume of cases in the "list room" generally prevents the prosecutor
from initiating plea bargaining before the trial date, and an absent
witness, missing piece of evidence, or dilatory defense counsel frequently
hampers the immediate disposal of a case on the day of trial. The
prosecutor will thus generally be willing to offer substantial concessions
to induce a guilty plea and thereby dispose of the case at that time.25
But if a case is ready for trial, the prosecutor is less likely to offer
concessions either to save time or to discount the possibility of acquittal
because list room trials are brief and generally result in guilty verdicts.
Several factors enhance the prosecutor's bargaining position when
the defendant is in custody. If the prosecutor believes that the de-
fendant has already been incarcerated for a sufficient period of time
and is willing to recommend a "time-in" sentence, the defendant will
invariably agree to plead guilty to obtain immediate freedom. 6 Even
if the prosecutor does not agree to a "time-in" sentence, an incarcerated
defendant, frightened and demoralized by the prospect of an indefinite
period of confinement, may be willing to enter a plea and accept a fixed
period of imprisonment. Finally, in a "jail room" case, the prosecutor
deals almost exclusively with an assistant voluntary defender. Because
the defender will probably work with the prosecutor again and will be
interested in maintaining a good relationship, he may often be highly
receptive to guilty plea negotiations.
2 7
The prosecutor's bargaining position is weaker if the defendant is
free on bail and he must make substantially greater concessions to
induce a guilty plea. Bailed defendants will naturally be reluctant to
enter a plea which will result in loss of freedom. Unlike the defendant
in prison, the bailed defendant can only profit by postponement of his
case. Over time, evidence may disappear, memories may fade, and the
defendant may be able to build a record of good behavior to help him
25 Assistant prosecutors generally wish to avoid having cases continued at their
request. But the methods employed to secure immediate disposition do not always
take the form of guilty pleas. Often defense counsel will agree to the stipulation of
certain testimony in exchange for prosecutorial concessions. Such stipulations may
or may not be equivalent to a "slow plea of guilty."
26 For example, if the defendant has been awaiting trial for 58 days, the judge,
pursuant to a "time-in" sentence agreement, may impose a sentence of 58 days to
23 months. Under this sentence, the judge has authority to release the defendant
from prison immediately and place him on probation for the remainder of the 23
months.
27 The defender has a more immediate interest in reaching an accommodation
than does the prosecutor. Most voluntary defenders agree that their primary
objective is to secure the release of their clients as quickly as possible. The assistant
prosecutor's desire to dispose of cases is tempered by his responsibility for obtaining
appropriate sentences. Also, an assistant prosecutor may feel relatively free to
sacrifice the efficient disposal of cases on a given day if he believes this will lead to
some future prosecutorial benefit (such as showing defense counsel that he "means
what he says").
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at sentencing. Furthermore, a bailed defendant is likely to be repre-
sented by a private attorney who deals infrequently with the prosecutor.
The private attorney will thus have little incentive to develop a good
working relationship with the assistant prosecutor and can concentrate
on obtaining the best possible result for his client.
"Major cases" include the four main felonies (homicide, rape,
robbery, and arson), other serious cases such as extortion by a public
official or extremely aggravated assault and battery, and cases re-
quiring special attention because of complex legal or factual issues.
Because a major trial prosecutor is expected to prepare each case care-
fully, he is assigned his relatively few cases at an early stage of the
proceedings. In theory, then, he has an opportunity to negotiate a
guilty plea well before the trial date. But in practice, major trial pros-
ecutors generally do not conduct serious plea negotiations in one case
while trying another. As a result, plea negotiations are often deferred
until the day the case is listed for trialY8
The major trial prosecutor's willingness to offer concessions often
depends largely on factors unrelated to the seriousness of the case or
its probable trial time. For example, his pending work load may be
quite important. If he has several cases listed for trial at approximately
the same time, he will be anxious to obtain pleas in some of them in
order to ease his schedule and improve the condition of the dockets.
Contrary to office policy, likelihood of conviction is generally very
important in determining what concessions will be offered to induce a
plea. While some trial prosecutors enjoy the challenge of a difficult
case, most will offer substantial concessions rather than risk losing a
jury trial. Moreover, as one member of the office candidly stated, each
prosecutor's attitude towards the trial of a weak case depends on "his
position in the office at the time of the trial." 9 Assistant prosecutors
in the major trial division feel that they are evaluated more on their
ability to win jury trials than to dispose of cases efficiently. An
assistant prosecutor who has just been assigned to the major trial
division or who has recently lost one jury trial may offer substantial
concessions in a case which he believes would be difficult to win before
a jury rather than jeopardize his position in this prestigious division by
a jury trial loss.
Some major trial prosecutors admit that their interest in a case
influences the type of concessions they will offer to induce a plea. As
2 8 Interviews with various major trial prosecutors, in Philadelphia, Mar. 24-26,
1970 (anonymity requested); interview with former major trial prosecutor Alan J.
Davis, in Philadelphia, Mar. 25, 1970.
29 Interview with major trial prosecutor, in Philadelphia, Mar. 24, 1970 (anonymity
requested).
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one assistant prosecutor stated, "When I get a case that looks interest-
ing and I think I can win it, I don't want to encourage a guilty plea.
I joined the district attorney's office so that I could try that kind of
case to a jury." 0
The same assistant also noted that he would be more willing to
offer concessions to induce a plea if he considered the defendant's
counsel personally objectionable." Other prosecutors suggested that
they would be more likely to offer substantial concessions to attorneys
they found consistently honest and cooperative.3 2 In addition, many
admitted that they are willing to increase the concessions offered to
induce a plea when the defense attorney's skill decreases the chances
of conviction.3
Of course, major trial prosecutors assign considerable importance
to the nature of their case in determining sentence concessions. But
in assessing the seriousness of a case, most prosecutors do not rely
solely on such objective factors as the type of crime committed and the
defendant's age and prior criminal record. More than two thirds of
the Philadelphia major trial prosecutors stated that their personal
evaluation of the defendant is an important determinant of sentence
recommendations.3 4 This subjective evaluation naturally introduces
into the plea bargaining process an additional element of uncertainty
and further opportunity for arbitrariness.
B. New York
The New York Supreme Court Bureau3 5 disposes of an extremely
high percentage of felony cases by guilty pleas. Of the 1,404 cases
prosecuted from January 1, 1970 to April 29, 1970, 45 were disposed
of by jury trial, 8 by trial before a judge, and 1,351 (96.2 percent) by
guilty pleas.36
30 Interview with assistant prosecutor, in Philadelphia, Mar. 26, 1970 (anonymity
requested).
31 As the prosecutor explained, "I don't want to spend two weeks in court with
an obnoxious defense counsel." Id.
32 Interviews with various major trial prosecutors, in Philadelphia, Mar. 24-26,
1970 (anonymity requested).
3 3 Id.
34 Twelve of 17 Philadelphia major trial prosecutors subscribed to this state-
ment. Only one stated that he would give this factor little or no significance. These
results are based on a questionnaire submitted to the major trial prosecutors on Mar.
25, 1970 and returned to me by Michael J. Rotko, Chief of Litigation, on May 12,
1970.
35 The New York Supreme Court Bureau is the branch of the New York district
attorney's office which prosecutes felony cases.36 Interview with William Keenan, Chief of the New York City Homicide Divi-
sion, in New York City, Apr. 28, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Keenan Interview].
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1. Office Policy
The need to induce guilty pleas is much greater in New York than
in Philadelphia. According to Homicide Chief William Keenan, the
New York Supreme Court Bureau must dispose of approximately
5,000 felony cases annually." Due to limited courtroom and other
administrative resources, only 150 to 175 of these cases can be tried
to a jury. Defense attorneys do not readily agree to nonjury trials,3"
and thus a very large number of defendants must be persuaded to
plead guilty.
Concessions are offered to induce pleas in most cases but, ac-
cording to Chief Keenan, the extent of these concessions depends
primarily upon the defendant's age, his prior criminal record, the type
of crime he is charged with, and the strength of the state's case.39 The
nature of the crime committed is most important. Top prosecutors
strongly support the view that their limited resources should be con-
served for the trial of cases involving particularly serious offenses. As
in Philadelphia, the seriousness of a case depends on various factors,
particularly the defendant's probable future danger to the community.
After preliminary arraignment, each case is assigned to an assistant
prosecutor for trial,4' who must dispose of his cases with reasonable
speed to retain his position as a major trial prosecutor.' Prosecutors
with substantial trial experience have complete discretion to strike
whatever guilty plea bargains they deem appropriate, and top assistants
review their decisions only briefly.42 Despite the freedom given indi-
vidual prosecutors, office policy favors uniform plea bargaining prac-
tices. Chief Keenan asserts that this goal is substantially achieved
because, by sharing experiences with other assistant prosecutors, judges,
and defense counsel, each assistant develops a common understanding
of the appropriate concessions to offer in each case.
43
3
7Id.
3s Defense attorneys' reluctance is explained in part by the fact that the New
York prosecutor's office will not reward a defendant for merely waiving his right to
a jury trial. To receive significant prosecutorial concessions, the defendant must
agree to plead guilty.
39 Keenan Interview. The New York office does have more detailed written
rules governing plea bargaining than the Philadelphia office. They are available
only to attorneys in the office.
40 Id. Homicide cases may be assigned to a prosecutor prior to arraignment. Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. After a New York assistant prosecutor has disposed of a case (whether
by guilty plea or otherwise), he is required to fill out a printed form and submit it
to District Attorney Frank S. Hogan. When properly filled out, this form contains
information concerning the defendant's age, background, and prior record, the type
of crime, the use of force or weapons, the extent of injuries to the victim, and the
amount of property taken. Space is also available for additional comments by the
assistant prosecutor.
4 3 Keenan Interview.
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2. Actual Practice
Plea bargaining practices in New York differ from those in
Philadelphia in two important respects. First, as noted earlier, because
more guilty pleas must be entered in New York, the concessions offered
to defendants are concomitantly increased." Second, the New York
trial judge plays a far more important role in the bargaining process
than does his Philadelphia counterpart. According to Martin Erdman
of the New York Legal Aid Society, most New York defense attorneys
will not enter a plea unless they are certain what the judge will do. In
some cases the assistant prosecutor and defense counsel may seek
judicial approval of a tentative plea arrangement.' The judge gen-
erally agrees to accept the plea and either to impose the sentence re-
quested 4 or to permit withdrawal of the plea if he finds a more severe
sentence warranted. In other cases New York judges actively par-
ticipate in negotiations and often suggest appropriate plea bargains.
For the most part, however, New York plea bargaining practices
parallel the Philadelphia practices rather closely. Despite the office
policy in favor of uniformity, New York defense counsel have noticed a
marked disparity in concessions offered by individual prosecutors.17
As in Philadelphia, the type of bargain defense counsel can strike de-
pends in part on his relationship with the assistant prosecutor and on
whether his client is in jail.4" Finally, in deciding upon appropriate
prosecutorial concessions, the strength of the state's case is far more
important in practice than it is in theory.49 According to Martin
Erdman, "Prosecutors in this city hate to have a defeat on their
record. When they think they have a weak case, they'll go to great
lengths to avoid a trial." 50
44 Martin Erdman of the New York Legal Aid Society cites as an example a
case where the defendant has killed another man in a barroom altercation, but has
a colorable claim of self-defense. In exchange for a plea of guilty, the prosecutor
would likely reduce the charge from murder to attempted manslaughter and his
sentence recommendation from 15 years to life imprisonment to 2 to 3 years imprison-
ment. Interview with Martin Erdman, New York Legal Aid Society, in New York
City, Apr. 28, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Erdman Interview]. In a comparable case
in Philadelphia, the assistant prosecutor would not reduce the charge below man-
slaughter and would recommend a sentence of 5 to 10 years imprisonment.
45 Erdman Interview; Keenan Interview; interviews with various defense counsel,
in New York City, May 5, 1970 (anonymity requested).
46 The New York assistant prosecutors formerly relied more on charge reductions
than on sentence recommendations in plea bargaining. This was primarily due to
restrictions on the judges' sentencing discretion. Today, however, New York judges
generally have discretion to impose any sentence from probation to the legislatively
prescribed maximum. Current plea bargaining efforts are thus more concerned with
sentence concessions. See geierally Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure: Its
Effect Upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 23 LAw & CoN=.P.
PROB. 495 (1958).
47 Interviews with various defense counsel, in New York City, May 5, 1970
(anonymity requested).
481d.
49!d.
50 Erdman Interview.
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT PRACTICES
The trial prosecutor's unchecked discretion is perhaps the most
undesirable feature of the plea bargaining process, and the major part
of this section will be given over to a catalogue of the potential harm
to society in general as well as to the prosecutor's office resulting
from this lack of restraint.5 Then the role of the judge in the bargain-
ing process will be briefly assessed.
A. The Trial Prosecutor's Unchecked Discretion
Professor Davis has discussed the problems likely to arise when
an administrative agency's powers are not properly defined and con-
trolled. 2 In the present situation, these problems are magnified because
each individual trial prosecutor is free to apply plea bargaining policies
he considers appropriate and to change these policies from case to
case: 53 the potential for arbitrariness and inequality of treatment is
indeed great. 4 Furthermore, if a defendant perceives that his ability
to strike a favorable plea bargain depends on his counsel's effective
manipulation of the system or on a particular trial prosecutor's attitude,
his natural reaction will be cynicism and disrespect for the law.55
The low visibility of the present plea bargaining system also
creates problems for the prosecutor's office. Plea bargaining should
be employed in a manner calculated to maximize the efficient use of
available trial resources. The absence of enforceable bargaining
standards, however, enables individual prosecutors to reject or accept
guilty plea arrangements for reasons unrelated to considerations of
office efficiency. The prosecutor's personal desire to try a case may
preclude entry of a guilty plea in an otherwise appropriate situation.
51 Society at large and the prosecutor's office do not necessarily have conflicting
goals, but they may often have conflicting priorities. Society is interested both in
securing protection and in providing criminal defendants with fair and even-handed
treatment. The prosecutor's primary objective is to provide efficient protection for
society. In Professor Packer's terms, society's values Will tend more toward those
incorporated in the Due Process Model while the prosecutor's will tend more toward
those incorporated in the Crime Control Model. See H. PAcym, THIE LIMITS OF THIE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968).
52 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 52-141 (1969).
53 Cf. id. 88 (discussion of the harm done when "policy-making power is exer-
cised by individual policemen").
5 4 See generally id. 142-44.
55 [A] real vice in the procedure may be that it often gives the defendant
an image of corruption in the system, or at least an image of a system
lacking meaningful purpose and subject to manipulation by those who are
wise to the right tricks. Cynicism, rather than respect, is the likely result.
Enker 112. Correctional authorities are convinced that defendants who feel that they
have not been fairly convicted and sentenced often develop a disrespect for the law
which makes it difficult for them to accept responsibility for their actions and begin
self-rehabilitation. See NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 44-47, 226-28; J. BENNETT,
A Prison Director's Views on the Public Defender, in OF PRISONS AND JUSTICE,
S. Doc. No. 70, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, 364-65 (1964).
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Conversely, the prosecutor's need to protect his litigation record may
lead to unwise acceptance of pleas.
The prosecutor's unrestrained discretion may also reinforce his
tendency to take advantage of the relatively ineffective bargaining posi-
tion of defendants unable to make bail. This practice plays a sig-
nificant part in perpetuating inequality between the rich and the poor
in the criminal process. The jailed defendant, because he is often
unable to prepare his defense adequately, may plead guilty in exchange
for minor prosecutorial concessions."6 In addition, as Professor Foote
has observed: "It is plausible, at least, that denial of pretrial liberty
provides a psychological inducement to plead guilty which would be
absent if the defendant were at liberty pending trial." " Our commit-
ment to the principle of equal treatment for poor criminal defendants,
expressed in Griffin v. Illinois,58 is subverted when prosecutors take
advantage of the jailed defendant's vulnerable position in conducting
plea negotiations.
5 9
Vesting trial prosecutors with complete responsibility for plea
bargaining also creates administrative burdens and may frustrate possi-
bilities for rehabilitation of defendants. Because trial prosecutors,
especially major trial prosecutors, tend to devote full attention to the
case currently on trial or the next case on the docket, they usually
postpone any attempt to negotiate a guilty plea until the day of trial.
The delay in the entry of the plea results in inefficiency because wit-
nesses must make unnecessary trips to court and because it is difficult
to estimate the number of trial courtrooms needed at any given time.
But more important, it is generally agreed that punishment or treat-
ment of criminals has maximum deterrent and rehabilitative effect if
imposed on the offender as soon as possible after commission of the
crime.6" When the prosecutor's failure to negotiate a guilty plea results
in a delay in the imposition of sentence, the beneficial effect of the
sentence is reduced.
Prosecutorial inducement of guilty pleas in weak cases also poses
potentially serious problems. When a New York or Philadelphia
assistant prosecutor has a case which he believes is weak, he will fre-
56See Comment, Bail: The Need for Reconsideration, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 678,
681 (1964).
57 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 961
(1965).
58 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
59 For a full discussion of the unequal treatment afforded defendants who are
unable to raise bail, see Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 1125, 1126-64 (1965). To deal with the problem of unequal plea
bargaining treatment, a major change in the structure of the bail system may be
needed.6oSee, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
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quently offer large concessions to induce a guilty plea. For example,
a Philadelphia major trial prosecutor related that in one case he
reduced his guilty plea sentence recommendation by two thirds in
order to induce a defendant who had a forty percent chance of
acquittal to forego trial. 1 According to Martin Erdman, New York
prosecutors often reduce their sentence recommendations by at least
fifty percent if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of a hung
jury, and by a great deal more if they believe that there is a fifty percent
chance of acquittal.' If the chances of acquittal are greater, the prac-
tice in both offices is to offer at least proportionately higher concessions.
Granting disproportionate sentence concessions in weak cases may
mean that an inordinate number of strong cases go to trial.3 An
effective allocation of limited prosecutorial resources would probably
send only uncertain-neither ascertainably weak nor strong-cases to
trial. Moreover, society may not receive adequate protection when
defendants are given disproportionate sentence concessions in exchange
for pleas of guilty. Finally, as many commentators have noted, this
prosecutorial practice may compel innocent defendants to plead guilty. 4
Prosecutors argue that appropriate precautions are taken to guard
against the possibility that an innocent defendant will plead guilty.
Chief Keenan asserts that all New York assistant prosecutors under-
stand that they must dismiss the charges against a defendant if they
are not morally certain of his guilt."", Martin Erdman, however, states
that in certain cases, particularly those in which the prosecutor is
relying primarily on identification evidence, an innocent defendant may
well plead guilty in exchange for a reduced charge or sentence con-
61 Interview with assistant district attorney, in Philadelphia, Mar. 26, 1970
(anonymity requested).62 Erdman Interview.
6 See Alschuler, supra note 4, at 72; Enker, supra note 13, at 112. Of course,
substantial concessions should not be made when the defendant is clearly guilty.
In such cases, defendants will probably enter guilty pleas in exchange for relatively
minor concessions.
64 See Alschuler, supra note 4, at 60-61 ; Comment, Offlcial Inducements to Plead
Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. Cni. L. Rxv. 167, 177 (1964);
Comment, supra note 11, at 220-21.
There have also been strong expressions of judicial concern over plea bargaining
which encourages innocent defendants to plead guilty. See, e.g., Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Bailey v. MacDougall,
392 F.2d 155, 158 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) : "Plea bargaining
that induces an innocent person to plead guilty cannot be sanctioned. Negotiation
must be limited to the quantum of punishment for an admittedly guilty defendant."
Professor Enker warns that the emotional nature of this problem may lead to
overstatement. He points out that we do not have conclusive empirical evidence
concerning how often innocent defendants enter guilty pleas, and suggests that "the
significant question is not how many innocent people are induced to plead guilty but
is there a significant likelihood that innocent people who would be (or have a fair
chance of being) acquitted at trial might be induced to plead guilty?" Enker, supra
note 13, at 113.
65 Keenan Interview.
452 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
cession. 6 Mr. Erdman further states that in these cases defense
counsel may be obliged to acquiesce in a plea bargain even though he
is not convinced of his client's guilt.7 The defense counsel's duty is to
obtain the optimal disposition of his case, not to determine his client's
innocence or guilt. Even if his client is innocent, counsel may urge
acceptance of a plea to a reduced charge carrying a short sentence rather
than risk a trial in which the defendant may receive a much longer
prison term.
68
B. The Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining
For the most part, judges have not contributed to the smooth
functioning of the plea negotiation process. The Philadelphia office's
experience with judicial participation in plea bargaining suggests that
its value to the prosecutor is doubtful. Prior to 1969, assistant pros-
ecutors and defense counsel would occasionally meet with judges to
explore the possibility of a guilty plea. 9 In these pretrial conferences
the judge would encourage 70 the parties to explore areas of agreement.
According to First Assistant District Attorney Sprague, the meetings
were not very fruitful because neither the assistant prosecutor nor the
defense counsel was willing to "talk turkey." The judge's presence
actually inhibited meaningful negotiation and decreased the chances of
reaching a plea bargain.7
In New York, active judicial participation has facilitated the
negotiation of plea bargains. But such participation may have serious
disadvantages. When a judge suggests to a defendant, either directly
or through his counsel, that he should plead guilty, the coercive effect
of this suggestion is likely to be overwhelming.72 Moreover, the judge
6 Erdman Interview.
6 7 1d.
68 See Alschuler, sapra note 4, at 61.
609 This procedure was discontinued after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969), held that any judicial
participation in plea negotiations is inconsistent with due process.
70 The meetings were generally called by the judge at the request of defense
counsel under rule 311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule
provides for a pretrial conference to be held by counsel in the presence of a judge.
The ostensible purpose of the pretrial conference is to consider means by which the
trial of a criminal case may be simplified.
71 Interview with Richard Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, in Phila-
delphia, Mar. 25, 1970.7 2 See United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (holding that "a guilty plea predicated upon a judge's promise of a definite
sentence . . . does not qualify as a free and voluntary act") ; United States v. Tateo,
214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding involuntary a plea of guilty made by
defendant after the trial judge communicated to defense counsel the sentence he
would impose if the defendant were convicted following jury trial); Commonwealth
v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 57, 252 A.2d 689, 691 (1969) ("The unquestioned pressure
placed on the defendant because of the judge's unique role inevitably taints the plea
regardless of whether the judge fulfills his part of the bargain."). But see United
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may jeopardize his role as an impartial arbiter of justice if he par-
ticipates in plea negotiating. For example, if a judge urges a de-
fendant to plead guilty in exchange for a two-year sentence and the
defendant rejects this arrangement, it would certainly be difficult for
the judge to preside over the trial impartially. The judge would be
aware of the defendant's probable guilt and would naturally desire to
vindicate his initial judgment that the defendant's guilt would be estab-
lished. At the very least, these factors would tend to sway the judge
from his position of neutrality.7" Finally, active judicial participation
in plea bargaining may unfavorably color the defendant's view of the
system. To the defendant, the judge becomes an adversary or at
least a compromiser rather than an embodiment of his guarantee to a
fair trial and an impartial sentence.74
III. A PROPOSAL FOR THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
Because courts have been reluctant to impose judicial control on
prosecutorial plea bargaining practices,7" impetus for solving the prob-
lems described above must come from the prosecutors themselves.
A. Suggested Procedure
One major change in the structure of the prosecutor's office would
eliminate many of the problems caused by current plea bargaining
practices. Several assistant prosecutors should be given responsibility
for negotiating guilty pleas with defense counsel at the earliest possible
stage in the proceedings.76 In Philadelphia, for example, one assistant
prosecutor could be chosen to negotiate pleas in homicide cases, one
to negotiate pleas in other major cases, and two or three to negotiate
pleas in the list room cases.7" These "executive prosecutors" should
States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721, 725 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
892 (1968) (judicial participation does not of itself render the guilty plea involuntary).
See generally Note, supra note 1, at 891-92; Comment, Official Inducements to Plead
Guilty, supra note 64, at 180-83.
-3 Recognizing these problems, Professor Fnker has suggested that the trial be
scheduled before a different judge. Enker, supra note 13, at 117. But even if this
suggestion were adopted, the possibility would remain that the second judge would
be adversely affected by his knowledge "that the defendant had declined a plea
agreement tendered by another judge." ABA STANDARDs, supra note 13, at 74.
7 4 See generally Comment, supra note 11, at 219-20; 19 STAN. L. REv. 1082, 1089
(1967).
'7 5 See generally Enker, supra note 13, at 108.
76 In Philadelphia, plea discussions could beneficially take place immediately after
the defendant's indictment. By this time, defense counsel has generally been able to
investigate the case sufficiently, and the executive prosecutor would possess the police
investigation report and any observations made by the assistant district attorney who
represented the Commonwealth at the preliminary hearing.
77The Detroit prosecutor's office apparently has implemented a procedure similar
to the one advanced here. One assistant prosecutor's "sole job is to screen cases
just prior to arraignment with the express purpose of obtaining guilty pleas to
reduced charges." NEwmAN, supra note 1, at 80.
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be among the most able and experienced in the office. They would
have full responsibility for evaluating the facts of all cases assigned to
them, deciding what sentence recommendations should be made upon
conviction following trial, and determining to what extent a recom-
mendation should be reduced upon the entry of a guilty plea. Their
recommendations should be based solely on criteria relating to the
defendant's criminal background, the crime committed, and the strength
of the state's case. Factors such as the assistant prosecutor's relation-
ship with defense counsel and whether the defendant is free on bail
should be completely excluded from consideration.
In cases appropriate for plea bargaining, the executive prosecutor
would contact defense counsel at an early stage in the proceedings and
either reach a plea agreement immediately 78 or arrange a meeting to
explore the possibility of an agreement. In these conversations with
defense attorneys, the executive prosecutor should make it clear that he
is offering a bargain as good as, if not better than, any he will be likely
to offer at a later time. If no plea is negotiated, the executive pros-
ecutor should assign the case to a trial prosecutor with instructions
concerning the range of proper sentence recommendations, the range
of concessions to be given upon a forthcoming plea, and the reasons for
these recommendations. 79  The trial prosecutor would have to state
persuasive reasons for any departure from the recommendations.8"
Implementation of these procedures would produce several im-
provements over the present system. By devoting himself exclusively
to plea bargaining, the executive prosecutor should develop a rich back-
ground of experience useful in resolving the more difficult questions.
He should prove a more efficient and objective plea negotiator because
he will not be engaged in the trial of other cases and because possible
7 8 The executive prosecutor in charge of list room cases should be able to arrange
many dispositions by telephone. In many of these cases, he can appropriately agree
to a recommendation of probation in exchange for a guilty plea. Most enlightened
authorities recommend increased use of probation in cases which are not especially
serious. See, e.g., N. MoRRIs & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO
CRimE CONTROL 119-23 (1969).
79 The allowable range of concessions should be sufficiently flexible to enable the
trial prosecutor to consider information unavailable to the executive prosecutor. In
rare cases, the trial prosecutor should be allowed a wide measure of discretion. For
example, if the chief Commonwealth witness is an alcoholic, the trial prosecutor
should be permitted to gauge the witness' condition on the day of trial before com-
mitting himself to a specific course of action. The trial prosecutor should also be
allowed to offer additional concessions to induce a plea in uncompromised list room
cases when the state is unable to go to trial. To insure that the trial prosecutor
accords equal treatment to similarly situated defendants, however, the executive prose-
cutor should carefully prescribe the additional concessions to be given in this situation.
80 To justify a bargaining concession not authorized by the executive prosecutor,
the trial prosecutor would generally have to demonstrate that he acted on the basis
of relevant information unavailable to the executive prosecutor. For example, if a
close relationship between the defendant and an alleged rape victim is brought to
light, the trial prosecutor would be expected to modify the executive prosecutor's
recommendations accordingly.
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conflict between office policies and his personal goals will be minimized.
In addition, placing the authority for plea negotiation in fewer, more
responsible hands would encourage uniform treatment of defendants.
Finally, under the proposed procedure plea discussions would be
initiated earlier, thus facilitating quick disposition of cases."'
One apparent disadvantage with the proposed procedure is the
executive prosecutor's relative inability to examine witnesses and de-
fendants in his assigned cases. Philadelphia major trial prosecutors
are expected to interview witnesses prior to trial in all cases,"2 but the
executive prosecutor in charge of major trials would be unable to
schedule such extensive meetings. In most cases, however, the ex-
ecutive prosecutor's failure to meet with witnesses will not substantially
impede evaluation of his cases. Investigation reports prepared by the
police generally give a full description of the evidence which can be
produced against the defendant. When a witness' statement to the
police differs significantly from his testimony at the preliminary hear-
ing, this may be noted on the police report by the assistant prosecutor
representing the state at the preliminary hearing." While this in-
formation may prove inadequate in some cases,8" major trial prosecutors
agree that, in general, examination of witnesses facilitates litigation
but does not significantly affect their determination of appropriate sen-
tence concessions.' In any event, the slight impairment of the ex-
ecutive prosecutor's ability to evaluate cases will be more than com-
pensated for by the time savings resulting from reduction of pretrial
meetings8 6
The executive prosecutor's inability to see particular defendants
would make it impossible for him to rely on a personal evaluation of
the defendant in determining sentence concessions. Elimination of this
subjective factor will improve the quality of plea bargaining. Under
the present system, a trial prosecutor is particularly unqualified to
evaluate the defendant's character because, in addition to lacking any
special expertise, his judgment may be distorted by his close personal
81 In addition to easing congested dockets, earlier disposition of cases would
result in shorter detention of defendants suitable for probation.
82In many cases, however, Philadelphia major trial prosecutors do not meet
their witnesses until the day the case is listed for trial. Whether an extensive pretrial
interview takes place at that time will depend on how quickly the trial begins.
83 In Pennsylvania, any defendant charged with commission of a misdemeanor
or felony is entitled to a preliminary hearing. See PA. R. Cam. P. 119, 120. In
other states, however, the defendant's right to a preliminary hearing is more limited.
See, e.g., K.Ax. STAT. AxN. § 62-805 (1964).
84 For a description of one such case, see Alschuler, spra note 4, at 68.
S Interviews with various trial prosecutors, in Philadelphia, Mar. 24-26, 1970
(anonymity requested).
86 The executive prosecutor's inadequate knowledge should not prejudice the de-
fendant because in most cases defense counsel will be able to bring to his attention
any information favorable to the defendant.
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involvement with the case. Moreover, elimination of personal evalua-
tion of defendants should encourage uniformity of treatment. In any
case, the sentencing judge's relative lack of personal involvement in the
case, and his probable access to reports compiled by experts who have
examined the defendant, places him in a far better position to make
judgments about the defendant's character.
At least three other possible objections to the proposed plan may
arise. First, it has been suggested that most prosecutor's offices simply
do not have sufficient manpower to place several experienced men in
primarily administrative positions.87  But this objection overlooks the
savings in manpower the proposed reallocation of prosecutorial re-
sources should achieve. If a substantial percentage of cases can be
compromised by executive prosecutors at an early stage in the proceed-
ings, the prosecutor's office will need fewer trial attorneys.
It has also been suggested that the proposed change in the struc-
ture of the prosecutor's office would be damaging to office morale.
Alan J. Davis, formerly a top assistant in the major trial division of
the Philadelphia office, suggests that this would occur in two ways:
"First, few capable and experienced prosecutors would be willing to
have their work limited exclusively to the tedious job of reviewing
cases and negotiating pleas. Second, the trial prosecutors would
resent this scheme as an encroachment on their authority." 88 Both
of Davis' points are valid to a degree. The increased pay and prestige
which should attach to the executive prosecutor positions, however,
will provide some incentive for experienced prosecutors. And, at
least in Philadelphia, some experienced prosecutors would be willing to
assume the administrative positions described, even without additional
pay, if they believed doing so would be helpful to the overall operation
of the office.89
Davis' second point is more difficult. Many trial prosecutors
feel that they should have the right to make all decisions concerning
disposition of their cases. One Philadelphia major trial prosecutor
stated that he would resign from his job if stripped of authority to
negotiate guilty pleas in cases assigned to him." But the recalcitrance
87 Interview with Michael J. Rotko, Chief of Litigation, Philadelphia district
attorney's office, in Philadelphia, Mar. 23, 1970.
S8 Interview with Alan J. Davis, in Philadelphia, Mar. 25, 1970.
89Two experienced major trial prosecutors stated that they would be willing to
take the position for up to one year. Interview with Victor J. DiNubile, Jr., in
Philadelphia, Mar. 24-25, 1970 (second prosecutor requested anonymity). It might
be possible for various highly skilled trial prosecutors to assume executive prosecutor
positions, on a rotating basis, for a six-month or one-year period. Such a plan
would have the added advantage of keeping the executive prosecutors in relatively
close touch with the problems confronting trial prosecutors.
90 Interview with assistant prosecutor, in Philadelphia, Mar. 24, 1970 (anonymity
requested).
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of some prosecutors should not be allowed to bar an otherwise beneficial
change. Major trial prosecutors will naturally be reluctant to give up
a portion of their power; but virtually unchecked power has indeed
caused many of the problems in the present system of plea bargaining.
Moreover, implementation of the executive prosecutor system would
enable trial prosecutors to concentrate on litigating cases, which they
presently perceive to be their primary function, and release them from
their role as "dealers in bargain justice."
Finally, it may be objected that the proposed procedure will neces-
sitate greater prosecutorial concessions to induce guilty pleas. Because
negotiations will take place at an early stage in the proceedings, the
defendant will not be faced with the prospect of an immediately im-
pending criminal trial and will thus be less willing to enter a plea. This
objection should not be overemphasized. According to one prominent
Philadelphia defense attorney, most defendants are guided by their
attorneys in deciding whether or not to enter a plea." In most cases,
an experienced defense attorney is able to determine what would be an
appropriate plea bargain quite early in the proceedings. 2  Thus, if the
prosecutor's offer is really in the defendant's best interest, an early plea
should be forthcoming.
On balance, then, the problems resulting from implementation of
the proposed procedure will be more than compensated for by sub-
stantial, long-run benefits for both society and the prosecutor's office.
B. Limits on the Executive Prosecutor's Discretion
To insure effective plea bargaining, the district attorney must
maintain some control over the executive prosecutor's exercise of dis-
cretion. Each office should thus formulate plea bargaining policies 93
and provide executive prosecutors with fairly detailed guidelines of the
criteria to be applied in determining appropriate concessions. While
such guidelines should not attempt to cover every conceivable situation,
they should give some indication of bargaining priorities. Among the
questions which should be answered are: What cases should not be
compromised? What rules should be applied when the prosecutor's
case is weak? What effect, if any, has a defendant's connection with
organized crime? What criteria should be applied in deciding the
93 Interview with defense attorney, in Philadelphia, Mar. 25, 1970 (anonymity
requested).
9 2 Defense counsel should be able to make this judgment soon after the preliminary
hearing. All he need do is investigate his defense and hear the evidence presented
by the state at the hearing.
93 Professor Davis has observed that "the chief hope for confining discretionary
power [is] . . . much more extensive administrative rule-making . . . ." K. DAvis,
supra note 52, at 55.
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sentence concessions a defendant will receive for turning state's evi-
dence? Since the guidelines would be promulgated only to the ex-
ecutive prosecutors, the district attorney should be relatively free to
answer these questions candidly and in some detail.9"
In applying office policies to new situations, the executive pros-
ecutors must, of course, be afforded some discretion. Also, if an
executive prosecutor perceived that a plea bargaining policy established
by the district attorney is not leading to effective utilization of trial
resources, he should have some latitude to reinterpret the policy. But,
although the executive prosecutors will often be required to exercise
discretion, they should also be required to submit their work to rather
close scrutiny in order to safeguard the district attorney's control over
plea bargaining. The executive prosecutor should file a brief report
of each case stating what concessions, if any, were offered, and why.
More detailed reports would be required only when the executive pros-
ecutor confronted a unique plea bargaining situation or initiated a
shift in prosecutorial policy. Such reports should enable the district
attorney to determine both the extent of compliance with the plea
bargaining guidelines and the need for modification of the guidelines.
C. Policies To Be Applied by the Executive Prosecutors
When the State's Case Is Weak
In formulating plea bargaining guidelines, the district attorney
should accord special attention to the rules to be applied when the
state's case is weak. The rules should reflect a sensitivity to the
probable guilt or innocence of the defendant, and not merely a con-
sideration of relative chances of acquittal or conviction. Four varia-
tions of a hypothetical case will illustrate several of the problems which
should be considered. In the hypothetical, defendant and an accomplice
are charged with robbery and burglary after allegedly breaking into
a dwelling house, threatening a babysitter with a gun, and taking a
substantial amount of money and valuables.
Variation 1. The defendant's accomplice, after making a full, sub-
stantiated confession implicating the defendant, flees the jurisdiction
and cannot be found. Without the accomplice's testimony, the state has
insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Variation 2. The
only evidence the state can produce is the babysitter's identification
of the defendant. It is undisputed that she saw the robbers only
briefly in poor light and that she originally gave the police a rather
sketchy description. The prosecutor is not at all sanguine about the
9 4 The prosecutor should make public, however, a general statement of the office's
bargaining policies. See text accompanying notes 122-26 infra.
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chances of a conviction based on this evidence. Variation 3. The evi-
dence is the same as that in variation 2, except that the defendant
confesses, giving a full account of the crime with details only the
perpetrator could know. The confession, however, is inadmissible
because obtained in violation of the requirements of Miranda v.
Arizona." Variation 4. Two hours after the robbery, police find the
stolen goods and the gun in the defendant's apartment. But there is
about a sixty percent chance that the evidence will be excluded because
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
Faced with the problem posed in variation 1, most prosecutors
would share the view of a Philadelphia major trial prosecutor who
said, "In this situation, I'd take a plea to anything I could get." " This
position is legitimate. Although defendant is clearly guilty, without
a plea the case will probably continue to clog the docket until dismissed
for failure to prosecute. It is certainly preferable that the defendant
be given some rehabilitative treatment, even if only a short period
of probation.
In variations 2, 3, and 4, the prosecutor is prepared to try the
case but the chances of a conviction are small. As noted earlier, the
practice in both New York and Philadelphia is to offer greater con-
cessions in weak cases. The stated policy of the Philadelphia office,
however, is against the practiceY If the prosecutor does not offer
special concessions to induce pleas in weak nonserious cases, many
defendants will have a strong incentive to go to trial and their election
to do so would seriously burden limited trial resources. Even in weak
serious cases, a prosecutor could legitimately offer increased induce-
ments, reasoning that society probably receives better protection if all
guilty defendants receive some punishment and rehabilitative treat-
ment than it does if some receive the "appropriate" punishment and
rehabilitative treatment while others are allowed to go free.
98
An objection may be made, on an equal protection theory, to plea
bargaining guidelines which give effect to the strength of the state's
case. A defendant against whom the state has a strong case may argue
.9384 U.S. 436 (1966).
96 Interview with assistant prosecutor, in Philadelphia, Mar. 26, 1970 (anonymity
requested).
97 It may be argued, in support of the Philadelphia position, that litigation is
most appropriate in cases where the outcome is uncertain. See Alschuler, supra
note 4, at 72; Enker, supra note 13, at 112. But, as noted earlier, the Philadelphia
office does have a policy of litigating "very serious" cases regardless of the certainty of
outcome.98 Uncertainty as to what constitutes "appropriate" punishment or rehabilitative
treatment precludes anything more than speculation on this point. Evidence indicates,
however, that increased incarceration may be counterproductive. See N. Mopus &
G. HAWKiNS, supra note 78, at 110-44. If this is the case, sacrificing maximum
sentences for some offenders to obtain some treatment for all offenders may better
protect society's interests.
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that he is discriminated against because he is denied the opportunity
to strike an equally favorable guilty plea bargain. But the defendant
in the weak case does not receive preferential treatment if the pros-
ecutor's concessions do no more than accurately reflect the uncer-
tainties of litigation. He receives a more attractive offer than the
defendant in a strong state case only because he is relinquishing a
greater chance of obtaining an acquittal. On balance, a policy of
attempting to induce guilty pleas by offering concessions which do no
more than accurately discount the uncertainties of litigation seems
appropriate. 9
In applying this policy, however, a sharp distinction should be
drawn between cases like variation 2 and those like variation 3. In
variation 2, the defendant's guilt is truly doubtful because the type of
eyewitness testimony involved is notoriously unreliable. 00 Thus, if
the prosecutor offers strong concessions to induce a plea, an innocent
defendant may be pressured into admitting a crime.'' To avoid this
undesirable result, office policy should prohibit plea discussions in this
type of case unless initiated by the defendant. Even then, the ex-
ecutive prosecutor should offer no substantial concessions until the
defendant produces evidence which convincingly demonstrates his
guilt. For this proposal to work, of course, it will be necessary to
preclude use at trial of any statements made by the defendant during
plea negotiations.0 2 In variation 3, the strength of the evidence elim-
inates any substantial risk that an innocent defendant will be induced
to plead guilty.0 3 In such cases, the executive prosecutor should be
instructed to initiate plea discussions and to offer concessions which
accurately reflect the uncertainties of litigation.''
It may be argued, however, that since the prosecutor's decision to
initiate plea discussions is prompted by an illegally obtained confession,
any resulting guilty plea is the unlawful fruit of that confession.10 5
09 Cf. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dictum).
100 See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1961).
101 This is, of course, different from the situation where a defendant guilty of
one crime pleads guilty to a lesser offense of which he is innocent. The latter
situation does not present serious problems because the label placed on a defendant's
conduct is generally not important; only the sentence he receives is significant.
102 In some jurisdictions, statutes forbid- introduction of evidence pertaining to
a defendant's offer to plead guilty. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.4 (1970).
The ABA study takes the position that such evidence should not be admissible.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, at § 3.4, at 77.
103 The problem with this analysis is that it will occasionally be very difficult
for the executive prosecutor to determine whether the defendant's guilt is truly
doubtful. If the executive prosecutor initiates plea bargaining and is told by defense
counsel that the defendant is innocent, the executive prosecutor should cease discussion.
104 As noted earlier, however, under no circumstances should the prosecutor's
concessions do more than reflect the uncertainties of litigation.
'
0 5 See generally Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and
Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579 (1968).
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But the executive prosecutor is not using the confession to place the
defendant at a disadvantage; 16 rather, he is offering the defendant a
choice between litigating his case and settling it on favorable terms. 7
In variation 4, the sole evidence against the defendant was ob-
tained as a result of police conduct which is probably illegal. Professor
Alschuler has argued that when the prosecution induces guilty pleas in
cases of this type, the deterrent impact of the exclusionary rule on
illegal police conduct is diminished."' 8 He reasons that the police may
feel that a search of dubious legality is preferable to no search at all
because the evidence obtained, although inadmissible at trial, may be
helpful in inducing a guilty plea." 9 But police officers are generally
more interested in their arrest record than in the ultimate disposition
of their cases."' If the officer believes that his choice is between no
search and one leading to a successful arrest, his conduct will probably
not be affected by the exclusionary rule. Moreover, in most situations
the officer, lacking expert legal knowledge, will believe that there is
some chance that the evidence obtained can be properly introduced at
the defendant's trial. Thus, in the situation posed by Professor
Alschuler, the officer has an incentive to make an illegal search regard-
less of the possibility of a guilty plea. In my judgment, the slight and
rather speculative deterrent impact to be gained by prohibiting plea
bargaining in this situation would be more than offset by the resulting
strain on our system." Therefore, in variation 4, the prosecutor may
106 If the police failed to give the defendant the warnings required by Miranda,
counsel will almost certainly be aware that the confession is inadmissible. If defense
counsel is ignorant in this respect, the executive prosecutor should not attempt to
induce a guilty plea on the strength of the illegal evidence.
107 Indeed, the defendant in variat ion 2 might have a basis for complaint because,
unlike the defendant who confessed, he was not offered a chance to settle his case
on favorable terms. The best answer to this complaint is that the proposed procedure
is necessary to prevent innocent people from pleading guilty.
108 Many exclusionary rules are designed, at least in part, to discourage
illegal conduct by insuring that this conduct will not contribute to successful
prosecution. Under the guilty-plea system, however, unconstitutional behavior
frequently does contribute to successful prosecution.
Alschuler, supra note 4, at 82.
109
Only a thorough-going demonstration that illegal conduct will be unpro-
ductive seems likely to influence his [the police officer's] behavior . . . . An
officer should be discouraged from thinking, "I know that it is probably
illegal to enter this apartment; but the prosecutor may nevertheless be able
to make something of the case. He seems able to get some kind of guilty-
plea from almost every defendant, and I can therefore be reasonably con-
fident that the defendant will be convicted of something."
Id. 83.
11o See A. NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD 53 (1967) ; J. SKOLNIcK, JusTIcE
WITHOUT TRIAL 219-20 (1966).
11 Professor Amsterdam, while acknowledging the basic wisdom of the exclu-
sionary rule, notes that important societal interests may be sacrificed if it is employed
"beyond the confines of necessity." Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255:
A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 389 (1964) (footnotes omitted) :
In every litigation in which exclusion is in issue, a strong public interest
in deterring official illegality is balanced against a strong public interest in
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properly offer concessions to induce the defendant to plead guilty rather
than assert his search and seizure claim at trial." 2
IV. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The proposals offered thus far have been directed at prosecutorial
plea bargaining practices. But the judge's role in plea bargaining must
also be examined. To date, the judge's involvement has tended
towards one of two undesirable models: either the trial judge actively
participates in the bargaining process, or he blinds himself to the realities
of plea bargaining and engages in the ritual of asking the defendant
whether prosecutorial concessions have played a part in inducing his
guilty plea."' Although a judge should remove himself from the
bargaining process to protect his role as an impartial arbiter, he should
also recognize that many guilty pleas occur as a result of prosecutorial
concessions. When receiving pleas, the judge should impose safe-
guards which protect defendants without unreasonably jeopardizing the
prosecutor's efficiency in disposing of cases.
Limiting the judge's sentencing discretion in cases involving bar-
gained pleas would promote these dual ends. The trial judge should
be bound either to impose a sentence no greater than that recommended
by the prosecutor or to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. This
requirement would protect defendants by assuring them that the pros-
ecutor's recommendation sets an absolute ceiling on the sentence which
may be imposed if their plea is accepted; it would promote prosecutorial
efficiency because defendants would naturally be more willing to enter
into plea agreements.
Trial judges must also minimize the possibility that innocent de-
fendants will enter guilty pleas." 4 Although all federal judges and most
convicting the guilty. As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time,
it seems that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing
returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a public nuisance.
1 2 In both New York and Pennsylvania, the defendant may litigate a search and
seizure claim in a pretrial hearing. If the defendant loses on this claim, he may
then enter a guilty plea. In Pennsylvania, by entering the plea the defendant waives
his right to appeal an adverse ruling on the pretrial motion. In New York, however,
the defendant may appeal an adverse ruling even after entering a plea. Of course,
the prosecutor may offer the defendant special concessions if he will plead guilty
and forego his pretrial claim.
I's See United States v. Jackson, 390 F2d 130, 138 (7th Cir. 1968) (Kiley, J.,
dissenting) :
"[P]lea bargaining" is commonly practiced covertly. After the guilty
plea is negotiated by the prosecutor and defense counsel and agreed to by
the defendant, defendant follows the rubric of telling the court no promise
has induced the plea, and while this game is played the prosecutor and
defense counsel mutely corroborate the defendant's false statement. Often a
court knows of the negotiations and yet plays its part in the rubric by
asking the question about any promise, knowing that the answer will be false.
14 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (dictum).
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state judges must inquire into the "factual basis" of a guilty plea,"'
many consider this requirement satisfied merely by asking the defendant
whether he is in fact guilty of the crime charged. But an affirmative
answer to this question may only be a reaffirmation of the defendant's
genuine desire to enter a plea. Rather than engage in this meaningless
ritual, judges should require the defendant to detail the circumstances
of his alleged crime. While this device is not infallible, it should give
the judge some insight into the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant.
In addition, the judge should examine all of the evidence against the
defendant." If, upon examining this evidence and hearing the de-
fendant, the judge seriously doubts the defendant's guilt, 17 he should
either refuse to accept the plea or at least strongly urge the defendant to
go to trial."18
Judges must also assume greater responsibility for evaluating pros-
ecutorial plea bargaining policies. Professor Davis has criticized "the
complete lack of supervision of the typical city or county prosecutor." 119
The top prosecutors of federal, state, and local governments
are typically subject to little or no checking either by higher
11, Federal judges are given this responsibility by rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a court may not enter judgment upon a
plea of guilty "unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." Several
states have adopted a similar requirement. See People v. Perine, 7 Mich. App. 292,
151 N.W2d 876 (1967); State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968).
An Alabama statute requires the trial judge to hear witnesses produced by the
prosecutor and the defendant, or those summoned by the judge, and to accept a
guilty plea only if he believes the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. AiA.
CODE tit. 15, § 264 (1958). VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-192 (1950) provides: "Upon a
plea of guilty in a felony case, tendered in person by the accused after being advised
by. counsel, the court shall hear and determine the case without the intervention of
a jury . . . ." For a general discussion of the federal and state law on this issue,
and the American Bar Association's recommendation, see ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 13, at § 1.6, at 30-34.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the Supreme Court held that it
was a violation of due process "for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea
without an affirmative showing [on the record] that [the plea] was intelligent and
voluntary." Id. at 242. Justice Harlan, dissenting, interpreted this holding to mean
that "the prophylactic procedures of Criminal Rule 11 are substantially applicable
to the States as a matter of federal constitutional due process." Id. at 247. If this
is the correct interpretation of Boykin, state judges may be required by the Consti-
tution to inquire into the factual basis for a plea.
116 Note, supra note 1, at 885, criticizes this approach on the ground that it
"ignores the distinction between the guilty plea procedure and the trial procedure,
and apparently directs the court to engage in an abridged trial to determine actual
guilt, something that even a formal trial only inaccurately accomplishes." But the
procedure contemplated would not constitute an "abridged trial" because in most
cases the judge could make his determination on the basis of the police report and
other material submitted to him by the prosecutor. Only in exceptional cases would
witnesses need to be called.
111 A more precise standard should not be attempted. Since the judge is exam-
ining the evidence in a relatively informal manner, he is not in a position to make
a more concrete determination of guilt. Cf. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, at
§ 1.6, at 33.
11s If the defendant prefers to plead guilty even though he has a defense which
might be successful, the judge should probably not forbid entry of a plea. See McCoy
v. United States, 363 F.2d 306, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dictum).
119 K. DAvis, supra note 52, at 207.
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officers or by reviewing courts, no matter how seriously they
have abused their powers and no matter how flagrant the
injustice.
20
He invites courts to reconsider their traditional reluctance to review
various aspects of the prosecutorial function, including plea bargain-
ing. 2 1 To facilitate judicial scrutiny, consideration should be given to
requiring the prosecutor to issue publicly a formal statement of his
policies. 2 The defendant should have the right to challenge a bargain-
ing standard on the ground that, as applied to him,128 it is contrary to
public policy. Either side should be permitted to appeal the judge's
ruling on this claim. Adoption of this proposal would promote the
uniform application of plea bargaining rules and would also give the
highest courts of a state the opportunity to evaluate prosecutorial
policies.'
Finally, trial judges should endeavor to assure defendants of
uniform plea bargaining treatment.' To insure that the prosecutor's
policies are being applied uniformly, trial judges, before accepting a
plea, should require a fairly detailed statement of the reasons supporting
the sentence concessions. 2 6 If the judge believes that the prosecutor
is dealing less leniently than customary with a particular defendant, he
may impose a sentence less severe than the prosecutor's recommenda-
tion; if he believes the prosecutor is excessively generous, he may
refuse to accept the plea.
=0 Id.
121 Id. 213.
122 Cf. id. 58 (emphasis in original):
The important part of the basic judicial purpose is to protect against
unguided discretionary power to decide individual cases, whenever meaningful
guides are feasible. From the standpoint of justice to the individual party,
guides created by the administrators can be about as effective as guides
imposed by a statute. Accordingly, I propose that the courts should continue
their requirement of meaningful standards, except that when the legislative
body fails to prescribe the required standards the administrators should be
allowed to satisfy the requirement by prescribing them within a reasonable
time.
'28 The problem of when a defendant has standing to challenge a particular
administrative standard raises intricate issues beyond the scope of this paper. For
a general discussion of the problem, see 3 K. DAvis, AMiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 22.01-22.18 (1958).
124 One problem with this proposal is that the prosecutor, as the chief law
enforcement officer of a city and often an elected official, may believe that he cannot
politically afford to acknowledge that he deals leniently with many offenders. Thus,
a requirement that he place his sentencing policies on record might lead him to
formulate unreasonably tough policies. To avoid this undesirable situation, perhaps
the prosecutor should be required to give a general formulation of priorities rather
than a concrete delineation of rules. This type of statement would preserve the
prosecutor's flexibility while giving the courts some assistance in checking his exercise
of discretion.
125 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, at §3.1(c), at 68.
'26 Cf. K. DAvis, supra note 52, at 103-06.
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But how may the judge protect a defendant who refuses to plead
guilty because he believes he has not been offered concessions equal to
those offered similarly situated defendants? If the defendant is allowed
to apply to the court for relief prior to trial, the undesirable consequence
will be early judicial intrusion into the bargaining process. But if the
defendant does not raise the point until after trial and conviction, the
societal benefits from effecting a guilty plea bargain are lost, since trial
resources will have been consumed and the uncertainties of litigation
put to rest. In my judgment, the appropriate procedure is to allow the
defendant to raise the point after trial but prior to sentencing. When
a defendant raises a claim of unequal plea bargaining treatment, the
judge should require the prosecutor to produce evidence illustrating
the policy generally followed in cases similar to the defendant's. If the
judge finds that the prosecutor's failure to offer certain sentence con-
cessions was a clear deviation from normal policy, he should impose a
sentence in keeping with the prosecutor's normal guilty plea sentence
recommendation. This procedure would both provide redress to de-
fendants who can establish unfair treatment and, by providing this
redress after a possibly time-consuming trial, give prosecutors an
additional incentive to apply their guilty plea bargaining rules
uniformly.
CONCLUSION
Guilty plea bargaining will remain integral to the administration
of criminal justice. This Article has attempted to identify the major
problems with present plea bargaining practices and to propose means
for alleviating these problems without sacrificing prosecutorial efficiency.
The plea bargaining practices in New York and Philadelphia are
detrimental to society's interests. The wide discretion allowed indi-
vidual prosecutors leads to disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants and, inevitably, to disrespect for the law. The disad-
vantaged position of indigent defendants is exacerbated by the practice
of offering greater concessions to defendants on bail. And, the indi-
vidual prosecutor's desire to avoid defeat may lead to offering con-
cessions which induce innocent defendants to enter guilty pleas.
Both the district attorney and the courts must meet these prob-
lems. Prosecutors must seriously commit themselves to developing
fair plea bargaining policies. The executive prosecutor system pro-
posed herein should facilitate application of plea bargaining policies
attuned to the often competing needs of the prosecutor's office and
society. Trial judges must recognize that plea bargaining does occur
and endeavor both to scrutinze the prosecutor's policies and to guar-
antee certain minimum safeguards to defendants.
